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Abstract: Although exploring the principles of resource allocation is still important in many fields,
little is known about appropriate methods for optimal resource allocation thus far. This is because
we should consider many issues including opposing interests between many types of stakeholders.
Here, we develop a new allocation method to resolve budget conflicts. To do so, we consider
two points—minimizing assessment costs and satisfying allocational efficiency. In our method, an
evaluator’s assessment is restricted to one’s own projects in one’s own department, and both an
executive’s and mid-level executives’ assessments are also restricted to each representative project
in each branch or department they manage. At the same time, we develop a calculation method
to integrate such assessments by using a multi-branch tree structure, where a set of leaf nodes
represents projects and a set of non-leaf nodes represents either directors or executives. Our method
is incentive-compatible because no director has any incentive to make fallacious assessments.
Keywords: multi-branch trees; resource allocation; budget allocation; internal assessment; assessment
costs; allocational efficiency; AHP; ternary diagram
1. Introduction
Exploring the principles of resource allocation is still important in many fields. Although, in many
disciplines, including finance [1–3], economics [4–6], politics [7,8], marketing [9], and engineering
[10–12], many approaches such as Pareto efficiency [13] or Inequality Reexamined [14] have been
proposed for efficient resource allocation, little is known about appropriate methods for optimal
resource allocation thus far. This is because such methods should solve lots of issues. For instance,
the number of stakeholders who are operating from different standpoints is not small. Hence, the
meaning of “optimal” differs between each stakeholder, so it is difficult for them to reach a good
consensus. Not only that, there exist some practical restrictions such as limited resources or insufficient
amounts of time. Therefore, developing appropriate budget allocation methods is still an issue. In
addition, examining performance measurements for budgetary decision-making is also important for
developing effective budget allocation methods [15].
Cooperative game literature has many studies on efficient resource allocation [16,17]. In particular,
the core and kernel in cooperative game theory propose concrete feasible allocation. However, this
method requires not only assessment values measuring all objects for allocation but also those values
of any coalition of objects. Such a characteristic of requiring perfect information is almost impossible
to satisfy in many real situations because all objects must be assessed with a unique measurement
policy to do so.
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The field of resource allocation has few unique measurement policies for assessing an
object, although GMAT (Graduate Management Admission Test), for example, provides a unique
measurement for measuring some skills of pupils for business school [18]. Let us consider a competitive
fund organized by a national institution. Thousands of research agendas are submitted in Japan [19].
If the total required budget exceeds the available budget, the agendas should be selected. In this
situation, no one knows a unified criterion for measuring all agendas, and thus, agendas are actually
categorized into many small disciplines, which introduces too much segmentation. In each discipline,
a feasible number of agendas are considered and selected. The important issue with this method
is how much budget is distributed to each discipline. Normally, a primitive method is adopted. In
Japanese competitive funds, a budget is divided and distributed to each discipline in proportion to the
number of submitted agendas. That is, the acceptance rates of any of the disciplines are controlled the
same or almost the same as each other.
Local governments are facing the same issue. In Japan, two kinds of budget allocation systems
are generally used. One is a system in which budget allocators examine all projects. The system can
force allocators to use their extensive powers and resources, though it can lead to quite appropriate
allocations. The other is a system in which a budget allocator provides budget ceilings to each section
for each policy. This is based on precedent or incrementalism. Although the first system has been
in use for a long time, budget allocators are likely to avoid the system due to the huge costs needed.
This is why a Japanese nationwide scale questionnaire survey [20] found that some local governments
have switched to the second system. However, there is still a room for further improvement with this
second system [21]. In fact, we find that a certain city abolished the second system after adopting it for
ten fiscal years [22].
Although local governments in Japan consider such incrementalism for solving budget battles,
such a simple but rigid rule cannot capture actual needs, and thus, it is difficult to respond to
environmental changes adaptively. Not only that, it may lead to sectarianism, where winning budget
battles and getting money for one’s department are an absolute must. Moreover, they tend to spend
budgets wastefully at the end of a fiscal year.
With this research background in mind, the objective of our study is to find a feasible allocation
method that is better than the primitive method based on incrementalism [23,24] even if there is no
appropriate unified criterion. Here, we propose an allocation method that can distribute budgets
efficiently with imperfect information, not perfect information, in cooperative games.
To do so, we consider two points: minimizing assessment costs and satisfying allocational
efficiency. Assessment costs here mean the costs of effort spent on assessments including the costs of
designing a unified criterion that can be applied to all objects for allocation. Actually, designing such a
criterion is almost impossible, and thus, we should consider a method that determines all allocation
by integrating many assessments, the scope of which is local only. We developed a method in which
multiple evaluators assess all objects for allocation in a manner like the division of labor, and allocation
is calculated by integrating those assessments. Our method minimizes assessment costs.
The second point, allocational efficiency, is also an important issue. Let us consider a department
where two projects would like to get money. The director of the department may be one the best
people to assign money to those projects. Therefore, the director’s assessment on the relative weights
between the two can be extremely important information when considering budget allocation. We
believe that the popularity of the allocation method based on incrementalism and precedent that is
widely adopted in Japan is empirical evidence that budgets being distributed by directors to their own
projects in their department is one of the most effective allocation methods.
Thus, are there any allocation methods that are more rational than a method that uses budget
ceilings based on incrementalism? To consider this point, let us consider a small company that is
working on budget allocation. The executive is the person in charge of the allocation, and there are
several departments in the company. Each department is managed by a director and has several
projects to which part of the budget needs to be assigned. If the directors precisely assess the rates
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of allocation for the projects in their departments, is it possible to regard assessing one project only
among all projects as an assessment of all projects in the departments? An executive cannot consider
all projects in one’s company; however, if the executive selects one project in each department, it can
be considered that the executive assesses all projects due to supporting by the directors who assess the
remaining projects. The executive may not understand each project in detail. In this case, however,
the executive can request that the directors send reports on the selected projects. By doing this, the
executive may know the selected projects as do the directors. The executive can assess the relative
values between departments from their own viewpoint by comparing each selected project.
Here, we propose a protocol of allocation based on the above discussion. In this protocol,
a director’s assessment is restricted to one’s own projects in one’s own department, and both an
executive’s and mid-level executives’ assessments are also restricted to each representative project in
each of the branches or departments that they manage. At the same time, we develop a calculation
method to integrate such assessments. In our method, we use a multi-branch tree structure, where a set
of leaf nodes represents either projects or policies and a set of non-leaf nodes represents either directors
or executives. Our method may be balanced between minimizing assessment costs and allocational
efficiency, and thus, we believe it to be novel.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe our novel budget allocation method
for both a tournament model and a generalized model in Section 2. Some examples are provided in
Section 3. We analyze some salient features in Section 4. We then discuss the features of our method
and a further study in Section 5.
2. Methods
We define the new budget allocation method as a multi-branch tree structure. First, we define
some terms, variables, and maps in the first subsection. Next, we explain the procedure of our method.
In the procedure, we calculate a final allocation. This calculation of a specific type is easier than the
generalized type; thus, we first introduce the specific type, called the “tournament model” and finally,
we introduce the generalized model.
2.1. Notation
Let us consider that an organization is considering distributing its budget to projects where the
number of projects is set to N. Each project belongs to a department. A department has at least one
project. A manager of a department is called a director. The top of the organization is called an
executive. The executive manages all departments either directly or indirectly. If the executive manages
them indirectly, there are mid-level departments managed by mid-level executives managing either
departments or mid-level departments. This organizational structure is drawn as a tree structure using
graph theory.
Figure 1 shows an example of an organization. There are 10 projects (P1, P2, . . . , P10) that require
money, 5 departments (whose directors are E3, E4, E5, E7, and E8), and 3 mid-level executives (E1, E2,
and E6) and 1 executive (E0) in the organization. The departments own projects are {P1, P2} for E3,
{P3, P4} for E4, {P5} for E5, {P6, P7} for E7, and {P8, P9, P10} for E8.
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Figure 1. Example tree T(10,8)
We define a multi-branch tree structure T(n,m), where n is the number of leaf nodes representing
projects, and m is that of internal nodes representing evaluators consisting of directors, mid-executives,
and an executive. P denotes a set of leaf nodes {Pi} (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}), and E denotes a set of non-leaf
nodes {Ej} (j ∈ {0, . . . , m}). We call E0 the root node (the executive) and the others internal nodes.
The example tree of Figure 1 is defined as T(10,8) with 10 projects and 9 evaluators.
For any j ∈ {0, . . . , m}, we denote by Tj a tree consisting of Ej and all of its descendent nodes.
Note that T0 = T(n,m). Let Ej be the set of all child nodes of Ej and c(j) the set of the index numbers of
evaluators in Ej. A tree Tk (k ∈ c(j)) is called a child tree of Ej. Here, we call Sj the set of child trees of
Ej. For example, S2 = {T5, T6} is obtained from E2 in the example tree T(10,8) of Figure 1.
Next, we define a map l : {1, . . . , n} × {0, . . . , m} −→ Z∪ {∞} as
l(i, j) = h,
where h means the length of the path from Ej to Pi. In contrast, we define a map e : {1, . . . , n} ×Z −→
{0, . . . , m} as
e(i, h) = j,
which outputs an index number of Ej, where h means the length of the path from Ej to Pi. Note that if
Pi is not a descendant leaf node of Ej, we have l(i, j) = ∞, and e(i, h) is not defined.
For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we obtain only one shortest path from E0 to Pi and call it path i. For
example, we consider P7 in Figure 1. The parent node of P7 is E7, and the parent node of E7 is E6.
Repeating this procedure, we finally reach the root node, E0. We then solve path 7 as follows.
E0 E2 E6 E7 P7
<latexit sha1_base64="aYT6qkAqkLm1WIrYq6 vy/Y4WF0k=">AAACuXichVG7TuNAFD2Yd3iFpUGiiYhAVNENIB5LgxYhUYZHAIkga2wmweDYxnYigZU f2B+goGKlFUL8AS0NP0BBR8tuCRINBdeOBULhcUczc+bMPXfOzGiOaXg+0W2T0tzS2tbe0Zno6u7p7 Uv2/1j37Iqry7xum7a7qQlPmoYl877hm3LTcaUoa6bc0PYXwv2NqnQ9w7bW/ENHbpdFyTKKhi58ptTk 2qJKqULRFXpQODioiJ1aUEstquMfcFMfcNMNXI45NZmmDEWRagTZGKQRR85OnqGAHdjQUUEZEhZ8xiY EPG5byILgMLeNgDmXkRHtS9SQYG2FsyRnCGb3eSzxaitmLV6HNb1IrfMpJneXlSmM0A2d0wNd0wXd0/ OntYKoRujlkGetrpWO2vd7cPXpW1WZZx+7b6ovPfsoYibyarB3J2LCW+h1ffXo+GH158pIMEp/6D/7P 6VbuuIbWNVH/e+yXDlBIvqA2TCmXp+7EayPZ7ITmYnlyfT8r/grOjCEYYzxe09jHkvIIc/nXuIO9/i nzClC2VX26qlKU6wZwLtQvBeRd6sM</latexit> .
Note that every path i for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is a sequence from E0 to Pi.
2.2. Procedure
We explain the procedure of our method. First, we define all projects as objects for distributing
a budget, departments, directors, and executives as defined above. The second paragraph of the
Notation Subsection shows these terms with the example of Figure 1.
Step 1 Selection
First, all evaluators select projects that they must assess. However, all evaluators are prohibited
from assessing them before all assessments are done by those who are children. In the example of
Figure 1, E1 must wait until assessment by E3 and E4 is finished, and E0 must wait until all assessments
by E1 to E8 are finished.
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A set of projects assessed by any evaluator is determined with the following procedure. If an
evaluator is a director (who directly connects with leaf nodes), the director selects all projects in one’s
own department. In the example of Figure 1, a set of projects for E3 is {P1, P2}, and a set of projects
for E5 is {P5}. If an evaluator is not a director (that is, either an executive or a mid-level executive),
one selects a project among descendant leaves of one’s child node each. In the example of Figure 1,
E1 must select two projects; one is from descendant leaves of E3, and the other is from descendant
leaves of E4. In this case, all combinations are {P1, P3}, {P1, P4}, {P2, P3}, and {P2, P4}. Among them,
E1 selects a set. In the example of Figure 1, a set of projects for E1 is {P1, P3}. Note that the label of
every branch in Figure 1 is a selected project.
Step 2 Evaluation
Second, all evaluators assess the projects that they must assess. They give a positive real number
to each project as an assessment value. For capturing these values, we define a map v : {0, . . . , m} ×
{1, . . . , n} −→ Z, where v(j, k) means the evaluation value that Ej gives Pk.
Note that an assessment is given relatively. Let us consider that evaluator E3 assesses two projects,
P1 and P2, as shown in Figure 1. The assessment values of the two are denoted as v(3, 1) and v(3, 2),
respectively. However, these values are relative to each other. That is, the case of E3 giving v(3, 1) = 2
and v(3, 2) = 5 is completely equivalent to the case of E3 giving v(3, 1) = 4 and v(3, 2) = 10.
Step 3 Calculation
In the final step, the final allocation of budgets is calculated. To do so, we first calculate an
N-dimensional vector
W(T(i,j)) =
(
w(P1), w(P2), . . . , w(Pn)
)
, (1)
which consists of rates of allocation. Therefore, ∑w(Pi) = 1 (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}). Using this vector, the
executive distributes G× w(Pi) to Pi, where G is the gross of the budget.
Each element of W must correspond to each evaluator’s assessment. That is, for any evaluator Ej
and for any two projects Pi and Pi′ where Ej assesses both Pi and Pi′ , v(j, i) : v(j, i′) = w(Pi) : w(Pi′).
We developed a calculation method to solve W in the following subsections.
2.3. Tournament model
First, we consider a specific case, called the “tournament model.” In this model, any evaluator
except for the directors must satisfy a tournament condition where an evaluator selects projects that
were selected by the evaluator’s child evaluators. In the example of Figure 1, a set of projects for E1
is P1 and P3, and both P1 being selected by E3 and P3 being selected by E4 is satisfied. Therefore, E1
satisfies the tournament condition. In comparison, the set of projects for E2 is P5 and P7, but P7 is not
selected by E6. Therefore, E2 does not satisfy the tournament condition. There is an evaluator who
does not satisfy the tournament condition in Figure 1, and thus, Figure 1 is not a tournament model.
In the tournament model, all evaluators have restricted candidate sets for selecting projects.
However, the relative weight vector, W, is easily calculated. To explain this point, we define
some notations. Let Pj be the set of projects from which Ee(i,h−1) chooses projects for each
Tk (k ∈ c(e(i, h− 1)). Note that Ee(i,h−1) is the only one evaluator included both in Ej and path i
for Ej (j ∈ {0, . . . , m}) in path i. It is easy to see that Ej should choose a project from Pj. Define a map
p : {1, . . . , n} × Z −→ {1, . . . , n} that outputs an index number of Pp(i,l(i,j)) ∈ Pj, where Pp(i,l(i,j)) is
chosen by Ej as a selected project of Te(i,h−1). We label the edge that connects Ej to Ee(i,h−1) “Pp(i,l(i,j))”
as follows.
path i E0 · · · Ej
Pp(i,l(i,j))
Ee(i,h 1) · · · Pi
<latexit sha1_base64="ToOaNjKrU4y48wmqt753M 7GTQYw=">AAAC+3icjVHNThRBEK4ZUXBFWfRiwqXDBsJG2NQCUfFEJCQeF3CBhCGTnt5etmF2Zpjp3YCTeQEfQ A+cgBCjcPUJvPgCHngE4xETLxysmZ1olPhTne6u+qq+6q+7ncBVkUY8N8xrfddv9A/cLNwavH1nqDh8dzXyO6G QdeG7frju8Ei6ypN1rbQr14NQ8rbjyjVnZyHNr3VlGCnfe673A7nZ5lueairBNUF28ZWl5Z6OA65bCbOYYtbu boc32KKNzGqGXMRWGicxZUXD19Hv6KK9nUM1Ow4m1CRzadkul5NeNpYp1pqqlpP/a8hqtmJ2sYQVzIxddaq5U4 Lcan7xDVjQAB8EdKANEjzQ5LvAIaKxAVVACAjbhJiwkDyV5SUkUCBuh6okVXBCd2jdomgjRz2K055RxhZ0iks zJCaDMfyEb/ECP+IpfsbLP/aKsx6pln3anR5XBvbQy/sr3/7JatOuofWT9VfNGprwONOqSHuQIektRI/fffH6Y uXJ8lg8jkf4hfQf4jl+oBt43a/iZEkuH0Ah+4C51B7+eO6rzup0pTpTmVmaLc0/zb9iAEZgFCbovR/BPDyDGtT p3Etj1HhgTJqJeWy+M896paaRc+7BL2a+/w6Os8H3</latexit> .
If the evaluators are directors, that is, l(i, j) = 1, the child of Ej is just Pi. Hence, Ej should choose
the only child Pi as a selected project.
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In the tournament model, each element of W is calculated as
w(Pi) =
w′(Pi)
∑ni=1 w′(Pi)
(2)
w′(Pi) = v
(
0, p(i, l(i, 0))
) l(i,0)−1
∏
h=1
v
(
e(i, h), p(i, h)
)
v
(
e(i, h), p(i, h + 1)
)
.
(3)
2.4. Generalized model
Here, we generalize the tournament model. Any model that is not a tournament model is called
a “generalized model.” In this model, each evaluator is allowed to choose projects from among all
descendent projects. However, the calculation of W is more difficult than in the tournament model.
To calculate W, several v(α, β) should be calculated recursively. If v(α, β) is not given by any
evaluator, v(α, β) is defined as
v(α, β) = v
(
α, p(β, l(β, α))
)
·
v
(
e(β, l(β, α)− 1), β
)
v
(
e(β, l(β, α)− 1), p(β, l(β, α))
) . (4)
Using this recursive definition, and v(α, β), the assessment of Pβ by Eα, is absolutely solved. This
is because the first term, v
(
α, p(β, l(β, α))
)
, is given by Eα, and both the numerator and denominator
of the second term, v
(
e(β, l(β, α)− 1), ·
)
, are assessments by an evaluator who is a child of Eα.
Using v, w′(Pi) is calculated as
w′(Pi) = v(0, i). (5)
3. Example
In this section, we show an example of our method for easily understanding our method as
defined in Section 2. We consider an organization whose hierarchy is shown as Figure 1. In the first
step, every evaluator selects projects that one must assess. All labels of the links in Figure 1 are projects
each evaluator selects. In the second step, the relative assessment values are determined. In the
example, the following values are determined.
v(0, 1), v(0, 9), v(1, 1), v(1, 3), v(2, 5), v(2, 7), v(3, 1), v(3, 2), v(4, 3),
v(4, 4), v(5, 5), v(6, 6), v(6, 8), v(7, 6), v(7, 7), v(8, 8), v(8, 9), v(8, 10).
(6)
Note that these values are relative for each evaluator, and thus, v(5, 5) is meaningless because E5
has one project to assess.
While this model is not a tournament model, the left subtree of the root node can be regarded as a
tournament model because E1 satisfies the tournament condition and E0 selects P1, which is selected
by E1. Thus, we can calculate w(P4) by using a tournament model.
According to the tournament model, w′(P4) is calculated as
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w′(P4) = v
(
0, p(4, l(4, 0))
) l(4,0)−1
∏
h=1
v
(
e(4, h), p(4, h)
)
v
(
e(4, h), p(4, h + 1)
)
= v
(
0, p(4, 3)
) 2
∏
h=1
v
(
e(4, h), p(4, h)
)
v
(
e(4, h), p(4, h + 1)
)
= v
(
0, p(4, 3)
)v(e(4, 1), p(4, 1))
v
(
e(4, 1), p(4, 2)
) v
(
e(4, 2), p(4, 2)
)
v
(
e(4, 2), p(4, 3)
)
= v(0, 1)
v(1, 3)
v(1, 1)
v(4, 4)
v(4, 3)
. (7)
This is because we have l(4, 0) = 3, p(4, 1) = 4, p(4, 2) = 3, p(4, 3) = 1, e(4, 1) = 4 and e(4, 2) = 1.
The next example of the calculation is on P5. We calculate it by using the generalized model.
v(0, 5) = v
(
0, p(5, l(5, 0))
)
·
v
(
e(5, l(5, 0)− 1), 5
)
v
(
e(5, l(5, 0)− 1), p(5, l(5, 0))
)
= v
(
0, p(5, 3)
)
·
v
(
e(5, 2), 5
)
v
(
e(5, 2), p(5, 3)
)
= v(0, 9)
v(2, 5)
v(2, 9)
= v(0, 9)
v(2, 5)
v(2, 7)
v(6, 9)
v(6, 7)
= v(0, 9)
v(2, 5)
v(2, 7)
v(6, 8)
v(8, 9)
v(8, 8)
v(6, 6)
v(7, 7)
v(7, 6)
= v(0, 9)
v(8, 8)
v(8, 9)
v(6, 6)
v(6, 8)
v(7, 7)
v(7, 6)
v(2, 5)
v(2, 7)
. (8)
This is because we have l(5, 0) = 3, p(5, 3) = 9, and e(5, 2) = 2.
4. Mathematical features
Our method has some salient features. Here, we mathematically show three features. We call
targets of budget allocation projects, the evaluators who represent the nodes connected with leaves
directly directors, and the set of projects managed by any director its department.
4.1. Assessment costs
Every evaluator determines the relative weights of projects whose number corresponds to one’s
child nodes. This is equivalent to estimating the relative weights of the other projects when a weight
of a project is fixed to one. Therefore, the degree of freedom for each evaluator to assess all projects
corresponds to the number of one’s child nodes minus one. The following theorem shows that our
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method proposed is a method that can determine the relative weights of all projects uniquely with the
lowest number of assessments.
Theorem 1. Let N be the number of all projects. The total of the degrees of freedom for the assessments by all
evaluators is N − 1.
Proof. Let n1, n2, . . . , nE be the numbers of projects assessed by each evaluator. Then, ∑Ei=1 ni = B,
where B represents the gross number of branches. An evaluator, i, decreases the degree of freedom
by ni − 1, and thus, ∑Ei=1(ni − 1) = B− E. The following corollary shows that this value is equal to
N − 1.
Corollary 1. For any tree structure, let the gross number of leaves be N, the gross number of nodes except for
leaves be E, and the gross number of branches be B, respectively. B + 1 = E + N is satisfied.
Proof. This corollary is proven recursively. First, we consider a graph consisting of a root node
only. Then, child nodes are added to the graph sequentially, and finally we assume that the graph
corresponds to any tree structure. The first graph is a leaf only, and thus, the equation above is satisfied.
Next, we choose a leaf node that has a child node in the final tree structure, and that node and its
child nodes and branches that connect to it are added to the graph. Note that any tree structure can be
reproduced by repeating this procedure. Let the number of that node’s child nodes be k. By doing
this procedure, the number of leaves increases by k, while the target node does not become a leaf, and
thus, the increasing number of the right-hand side of the equation is k. By doing this procedure, the
increasing number of the left-hand side of the equation is k because the number of branches increases
by k. This is why the equation is always satisfied regardless of the procedure.
4.2. Allocational efficiency
In our proposed method, all projects are assessed by the directors who directly manage the
projects. Therefore, in each department, the relative assessments of the projects done by each director
are kept in the final allocation. This is why we regard allocational efficiency as something that is the
result of a knowledgeable specialist in each department.
4.3. Incentive compatibility
Our method is incentive-compatible because no director has an incentive to make fallacious
assessments. Let us consider when a director assesses a project lower than its true value. This
underestimation has a positive effect if an ancestor of the director (an evaluator who is not a director)
chooses the project because the allocation to the other projects of the department can increase. However,
if no ancestor of the director selects the project, the allocation decreases. As well, let us consider when
a director assesses a project to be greater than its true value. This overestimation has a positive effect
if no ancestor of the director selects the project, while allocation to the other projects decreases if an
ancestor of the director does choose the project. Regardless of either underestimation or overestimation,
it is possible to lose one’s benefit compared with the case of true assessment. Therefore, a max-min
strategist has no merit to make fallacious assessments. The following theorem supports our discussion
rigorously.
Theorem 2. If a director adopts a max-min strategy, one has no incentive to make fallacious assessments.
Proof. Let xi be the assessment value of a project i in all projects, f be a project that a director wants to
assess fallaciously, D be the department f belongs to, D− f be the set of projects of D except for f , q be
the fallacious value of f that the director wants to assign instead of x f , and S be the total of the relative
weights of all projects except for f (S = ∑i xi − x f ). Let T = ∑D− f xi. We set it so that the total of the
budget goes to 1 without loss of generality.
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Case 1: The total number of evaluators assessing f is one (only a director). In this case, the relative
weight of f only is changed to q from x f . Therefore, the allocation of i, which is not f , is changed to
xi
S+q from
xi
S+x f
, and the allocation of f is changed to qS+q from
x f
S+x f
. Therefore, the total allocation of
the department is changed to T+qS+q from
T+x f
S+x f
. The difference, ∆1, is calculated as
∆1 =
(T − S)(x f − q)
(S + q)(S + x f )
. (9)
S > T is satisfied, and thus, the allocation of the department decreases if x f > q.
Case 2: The total number of evaluators assessing f is more than one. In this case, no evaluators
except for the director change their own assessments, and thus, the relative weights of none of the
projects are changed expect for the elements of D− f . The relative weight of any xi in D− f goes to
x f
q
times of its original value. Therefore, the total allocation of the department is changed to
T
x f
q +x f
S+x f +(
x f
q −1)T
from
T+x f
S+x f
. The difference, ∆2, is calculated as
∆2 =
(S− T)(x f − q)T(
S + x f + (
x f
q − 1)T
)
(S + x f )q
. (10)
S > T is satisfied, and thus, the allocation of the department decreases if x f < q.
Considering these two cases, if a director makes a fallacious assessment, the total allocation of the
department can decrease regardless of projects chosen by the ancestors. Moreover, if the ancestors
choose suitable projects, the total allocation of the department can decrease regardless of the value of
the fallacious assessment (the value is both greater and smaller than its true value).
Note that we will extend the discusion above to analyze cases including that in which the ancestors
adopt the max-min strategy, or in which the evaluators adopt the expected-utility principle.
5. Discussion
We propose a new budget allocation method that determines all projects’ relative evaluation
values by integrating assessments among projects in small groups. Using this method, adopting
internal assessment within each group is considered to be quite rational because an insider generally
has a very firm grasp of one’s group and projects. In fact, internal assessment also lightens the
evaluation cost of budget allocators compared with an overall examination.
Our method is simple because each evaluator determines the relative weights of projects whose
number corresponds to the number of one’s child nodes, the relative weights of all projects are
calculated just as they satisfy the relative weights determined by each evaluator, and allocation is
determined by using the gross. As shown in Section 4, this is one of the methods whereby assessment
costs are minimized because all evaluators assess all projects through the division of labor. The
method is thus regarded as a method that uses backward induction [25,26] because allocation is
finally determined which keeps the relative weight rates of all evaluators. We will analyze aspects
of our method through comparison with methods of backward induction in the literature for further
extensions.
Our method is also one of the methods that satisfies allocational efficiency, where the lowest
evaluators in a tree structure assess all projects of their departments and the assessments are completely
maintained in the final allocation, as shown in Section 4. Although this simple policy is reflected in an
empirical view because we modify a widely adopted method based on incrementalism, our method is
deterministic and procedurally defined.
Although this method is for budget allocation for either medium-scale or small-scale organizations,
it is possible to substitute an organization, a section, a policy, or a person for a project. Therefore,
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the range of application for this method is very wide and includes budget allocation at large-scale
organizations, labor evaluation, and the assessment of employees.
As shown in Section 4, we considered the incentive compatibility of the method. Let us assume
that there is a malicious director, say M, among the lowest evaluators on a tree structure, and thus, M
wants to get more money by controlling their own assessments of projects in a department that they
themselves manage. If M can select the projects that M’s bosses assess, one could control the budget
allocation as one wants. Therefore, the projects that M’s bosses assess must be selected either by the
bosses themselves or randomly. As shown in the theorem of incentive compatibility in Section 4, our
method is safe from such a malicious director if M cannot control M’s bosses’ choices. As discussed
in the Introduction section, moreover, the bosses may not assess projects because they may not have
special knowledge on them. This is why the bosses require reports on sales points of the projects from
the directors. In consideration of this point, any evaluator must select and assess the projects that they
are in charge of after all of one’s lower evaluators in a tree structure have completed their assessment
of the projects that they are in charge of.
This study on our method is a first step, and thus, many issues still remain. In the current version
of our study, the issue of estimation is out of scope although important. This is because there is no
guarantee that a relative weight of a project assessed by any evaluator is correctly measured. This
point suggests that we must systematically consider errors in estimation if this is adopted for practical
use.
For further studies, two kinds of errors that occur during an evaluation should be investigated.
One is that internal assessment within each group is not necessarily appropriate. We cannot prevent
an insider from underestimation or overestimation caused by various types of human relationships or
preconceived ideas. The other is that an evaluator cannot give a relative evaluation value accurately
among representatives that reflects their real values. An evaluator may not be familiar with every field,
and the evaluator has to compare and evaluate projects that are in different fields. Thus, evaluation
among representatives requires careful consideration.
To reduce the influence on all evaluation values from errors of the second type, it may be useful
to choose more than one representative per group. In that case, we may adopt an average of the
evaluation values from a plurality of comparisons among chosen representatives. The effect of errors
is considered to be able to be neutralized with this scheme. We should thoroughly investigate how
many comparisons are needed, for which it is suitable to adopt arithmetical mean or geometric mean,
and so on.
The other extension is to consider the analytic hierarchy process [27], which is a traditional method
for quantifying qualitative data by using individual preferences, a ternary diagram [28], or a ternary
graph [29,30]. It may be effective to minimize the errors of both types.
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